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Does one have to be alive to be pregnant? The answer 
to this question would have been a very definite ‘yes’  – 
and would have elicited scant controversy  – in the 
earlier parts of the previous century. In the year 2014, 
however, answers to this question are less straightforward. Advances 
in reproductive technologies have made it possible not only to treat 
infertility, but to make imaginable what before had belonged to the 
realm of science fiction (for example, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World 
(1932) anticipated the possible consequences of the development 
of new reproductive technologies, while the idea of a ‘womb for 
hire’ was fictionalised in Margaret Attwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale 
(1985)). New reproductive technologies, now standard practice, are 
artificial insemination and reproduction, the cryopreservation of 
sperm, oocytes and embryos, embryo transfer, and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis and manipulation, to name but a few. Yet more 
new technologies, previously inconceivable, such as same-sex 
procreation, which will make it possible for gay and lesbian couples to 
have biological children without the help of a donor sperm or ovum, 
are currently being developed.[1]
Better healthcare, including drug development and advances in 
technology, such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation and life-support 
systems, have made it possible to treat previously fatal conditions and so 
extend human life. It has become possible to drastically extend the fertility 
of women a long time after menopause. Similarly, in the past, when a 
pregnant woman died or was declared brain dead, that would have been 
that, and no thought would have been given to keeping the fetus she 
was carrying alive. Before, upon the death of a pregnant woman doctors 
had two choices: either to deliver the fetus by caesarean section if it was 
viable, or to let the fetus die with the pregnant woman. This situation has 
changed dramatically with the development of new technologies able to 
artificially ventilate and sustain brain-dead human beings.
I read Prof. McQuoid-Mason’s article entitled ‘Terminating the preg-
nancy of a brain-dead mother: Does a fetus have a right to life?’[2] with 
great interest, and started pondering some of the ethical implications 
of the court case he discusses. The Munoz[3] case, in my view, 
highlights some of the very important ethical and legal implications 
of new technologies that enable pregnancy to be extended beyond 
the pregnant woman’s life. While not wishing to detract from Prof. 
McQuoid-Mason’s insightful analysis of the law in South Africa (SA) 
relating to the legal status of the fetus, I would like to shift the focus 
to an analysis of the ‘rights’ of the pregnant cadaver and the ethical 
and legal appropriateness of artificially ventilating the cadaver in an 
attempt to save the fetus.
I begin with a short summary of the facts of the Munoz case,[3] 
after which I differentiate between pregnant women who are brain 
dead and those who are in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), as 
this distinction is germane to my argument. My discussion of brain 
death brings me to a discussion in the next section of some of the 
ethical concerns raised by the Munoz case. This is followed by an 
analysis of whether the rights to equality, dignity, privacy and bodily 
integrity may find application in the situation of artificially ventilating 
a brain-dead pregnant woman so that she may give birth to a live 
fetus. I conclude the article with a few words of caution regarding the 
ethical desirability of new technologies that enable pregnancy to be 
extended beyond the pregnant woman’s life.
The Munoz case
Although the facts of the case are summarised in Prof. McQuoid-
Mason’s article, I provide a brief summary here for ease of reference. 
Marlise Munoz, a 33-year-old paramedic, was declared brain dead in 
November 2013 by the physicians at John Peter Smith Hospital in Fort 
Worth, Texas, USA.[4] Marlise Munoz was 14 weeks pregnant with her 
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second child when she got out of bed one night to prepare a bottle 
for her young son.[5] She was found unconscious and not breathing 
on the kitchen floor an hour later by her husband. It is suspected 
that she had suffered a pulmonary embolism.[6] Her husband (also a 
paramedic) immediately started cardiopulmonary resuscitation, after 
which Marlise was rushed to the hospital. Tests revealed that her brain 
had been without oxygen for an hour, and the consequences had 
been fatal, prompting a diagnosis of brain death.[7]
The court case, in essence, concerned an application by Marlise 
Munoz’s husband, Erick, for a court order compelling the hospital to 
take Marlise off a ventilator so that she could ‘die’ and her body be 
delivered to him and her parents to be buried.[8] Marlise Munoz had 
indicated earlier to her husband and parents that she did not want to 
be kept alive by artificial means.[9] The hospital refused to take her off 
ventilation, citing the Texas Health and Safety Code, proscribing the 
removal of ‘life-sustaining treatment’ from a ‘pregnant patient’.
The statute in question, however, only proscribed the withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment from patients in a PVS, and not from 
patients who were brain dead. The accepted legal position in the 
USA is that a patient is dead when ‘according to ordinary standards 
of medical practice, there is irreversible cessation of all spontaneous 
brain function. Death occurs when the relevant functions cease.’[10] I 
will refer to this definition later in the article. Erick Munoz also wanted 
the Texas Health and Safety Code declared unconstitutional as it 
violated his deceased wife’s right to make decisions regarding her 
treatment, and because it violated her right to equality as the statute 
treated pregnant women differently from other (non-pregnant and 
male) patients.[11]
When the case was eventually heard 2 months later (by which time 
the cadaver that had been Marlise was 22 weeks pregnant),[6] the 
Tarrant County District Court held that the Texas Health and Safety 
Code did not apply to Marlise Munoz as she was dead, and ordered 
that she be removed from life support.[3] It did not consider the 
constitutional issues raised in the application.
Brain death v. a PVS: Ethically relevant in 
this case?[14,15]
‘Brain death’ is defined in the USA by the Uniform Determination of 
Death Act[14,15] which determines that a person who ‘has sustained either 
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain 
stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards.’[14,15] The precise methods and criteria for 
determining brain death vary from state to state and hospital to hospital, 
but the American Academy of Neurology states that three criteria must 
be fulfilled to confirm the diagnosis: ‘coma (with a known cause), absence 
of brainstem reflexes, and apnoea (the cessation of breathing without 
artificial support)’.[16] In practice, clinicians will also look for an absence 
of motor responses and will rule out any other possible explanations for 
loss of brain function, such as drugs or hypothermia.[16] This assessment is 
repeated after several hours.[17]
In the UK, the National Health Service describes brain death as 
occurring when a person ‘no longer has any activity in their brain 
stem and no potential for consciousness, even though a ventilator 
is keeping their heart beating and oxygen circulating through their 
blood’.[18] When brainstem function is permanently lost, the person 
will be confirmed dead.[18]
Similarly, in SA the National Health Act 61 of 2003 defines death as 
‘brain death’.[19] Here, brain death is defined as ‘an irreversible and 
irreparable cessation of all the brainstem functions inclusive of 
complete cessation of the heartbeat, respiration, blood circulation 
and digestive functions’.[20]
There exists a clinical and legal difference between brain death 
and a PVS. PVS is a disorder of consciousness in which patients with 
severe brain damage are in a state of partial arousal rather than true 
awareness.[21] Patients lose consciousness because of a variety of 
reasons, most often through some serious injury or damage to a part 
of the brain. In this state, patients show some measure of digestive 
ability and some reflex activity of muscles and nerves in response 
to stimuli, and in some cases are able to independently maintain 
respiration and circulation. Nevertheless, there is no real awareness 
of the person’s surroundings or any other higher cognitive functions. 
After some time of being in a vegetative state, the patient is 
classified as being in a PVS.[22,23] In SA, one of the most well-known 
definitions of PVS is as follows: ‘a neurological condition where 
the subject retains the capacity to maintain the vegetative part of 
neurological function but has no cognitive function. In such a state 
the body is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls. 
It maintains digestive activity, the reflex activity of muscles and 
nerves for low level and primitive conditioned responses to stimuli, 
blood circulation, respiration and certain other biological functions 
but there is no behavioural evidence of either self-awareness or 
awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.’[24] Someone 
in a PVS can show signs of wakefulness (they may open their 
eyes, for example), but have no response to their surroundings.[24] 
The vital difference between PVS and brain death is that a patient 
with PVS still has a functioning brainstem and therefore may have 
retained some form of consciousness.[21] Also, a person in a PVS can 
still breathe unaided and is sometimes thought to have a chance 
of recovering because the core or ‘vegetative’ functions of the 
brainstem are unaffected, whereas a person with brain death has 
no chance of recovery as the body cannot survive without artificial 
support. Where the brain-dead person is in a PVS, the removal of the 
ventilator will be legally justified if the prognosis is hopeless. When 
a person is kept alive artificially by means of a respirator, its eventual 
disconnection cannot, in law, be considered the act which causes 
death – it merely constitutes the termination of a fruitless attempt to 
avert the consequences of the fatal injury.[24]
This brings me to the question of whether the difference between 
the two definitions is ethically and legally relevant in the case of 
Marlise Munoz. I think it is: the Texas Health and Safety Code did not 
apply to Marlise Munoz, as she was legally dead. This is evidently the 
correct decision, as the alternative would be the illogical situation 
that physicians are compelled to administer treatment to dead 
people. But what if Marlise Munoz were instead in a PVS?
If Marlise Munoz had not been brain dead, but in a PVS, ethically the 
case would have been more problematic, as there would have been 
arguments that she might recover in time (however slim the chance 
of recovery may be). In addition, the court would not have been able 
to decide the case without considering the constitutional challenges 
brought by Munoz’s husband (as she would have been a ‘patient’ and 
within the scope of the Texas Health and Safety Code). It is unlikely that 
Munoz’s situation would have withstood such constitutional scrutiny. I 
return to this point below.
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In the USA, as in the case of SA, patients’ rights to make autonomous 
decisions and to refuse treatment are, on the whole, respected.[26] 
Marlise Munoz had clearly indicated that she did not wish to be 
kept alive by artificial means, and her surrogate (her husband) had 
insisted on her autonomous wishes being carried out. Why, then, 
were the hospital personnel hesitant to carry out her wishes as 
expressed through her surrogate? This brings me to the next section 
of the article, where I consider a few of the ethical issues raised by 
the Munoz case.
Brief outline of some of the ethical 
concerns highlighted by Munoz
I suspect that John Peter Smith Hospital was hesitant to carry out 
Marlise Munoz’s wishes as expressed through her surrogate because 
of a misplaced concern regarding their legal responsibilities towards 
the fetus she was carrying. Such a concern is not unusual, as the 
relationship between a pregnant woman and her unborn fetus is one 
of the most ethically and legally challenging in the 21st century, and 
not only because of the technological advances described above. 
The renewed interest in the abortion debate in the USA and other 
countries bears witness to this complexity.[26-28]
Central to the Munoz’s case is the ethical and legal question: Is 
human consciousness necessary for pregnancy? Put differently, 
does one have to be ‘alive’ and conscious to be pregnant? Must the 
pregnant woman be a person with an identity, capable of making 
autonomous decisions? Or can she merely be an unconscious body, 
existing to gestate the fetus and be discarded after ‘giving birth’? 
Can the pregnant body be medically managed separate from a 
consciousness that wills the pregnancy to continue?[29]
I would like the answer to these questions to be that human 
consciousness is indeed necessary for a pregnancy. The choice to 
be pregnant is one of women’s most treasured human rights, hard 
won in the USA in Roe v Wade,[30] and legislated in SA in the Choice 
on Termination of Pregnancy Act[31] and confirmed in the case of 
Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health.[32] A woman may 
not deliberately choose to become pregnant (the pregnancy may 
be the consequence of rape, or be the result of some failure in a 
contraceptive device or the oral contraceptive pill), but her continued 
pregnancy, certainly, is a conscious decision for women in societies 
where their right to have an abortion is acknowledged in law.
In the case of Marlise Munoz, certainly, she indicated that she 
did not want to be kept alive artificially. The circumstances of the 
Munoz case indicate that this choice or advanced directive was 
less valued in the eyes of the law because she was pregnant. If that 
indeed is the case, and it does seem so, can we deduce that women 
in pregnancy lose their ability to make autonomous, informed 
decisions regarding reproduction? Such an outcome, at the very 
least, would be considered absurd: women’s rights to equality, human 
dignity, bodily integrity and privacy do not alter when they become 
pregnant. This is supported by the fact that, in many jurisdictions 
pregnancy is a prohibited ground for discrimination. For example, 
in SA: ‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy [my italics], marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.’[33] In Marlise Munoz’s case, the refusal 
of the hospital to turn off the machines that were ventilating her 
cadaver not only denied her (through her surrogate) the right to 
make decisions regarding her medical treatment, but reminds one 
of the worst of consequentialist philosophies (such as some forms of 
utilitarianism which would regard the violation of the dead woman’s 
wishes acceptable if the outcome is the birth of a live baby).
However, it should be remembered that, at the time the court 
action was brought, Marlise Munoz was brain dead. Even if it is true 
that women’s constitutional rights do not alter when they become 
pregnant, Marlise Munoz was not only pregnant, she was also dead. 
This, then, brings me to the next section of the article where I briefly 
examine whether the rights to privacy, equality, dignity and bodily 
integrity may find application in the case of a pregnant, brain-dead 
cadaver.
Equality, dignity, privacy and bodily 
integrity: Also applicable in death?
It is clear from the statute that gave rise to the Marlise Munoz case 
that exceptions are made for pregnant women – their advance 
directions are taken less seriously by the law than those of men, and 
those of women who are not pregnant. On the face of it, this clearly 
treats pregnant women unequally, potentially violating their right to 
equality. But do dead pregnant women have a right to equality?
I agree fully with Prof. McQuoid-Mason that cadavers are not the 
bearers or holders of either civil law rights or human rights.[2] In 
addition, there is no doubt that he is correct when he argues that the 
fetus, equally, has no rights in terms of the SA Bill of Rights until it is 
born alive.[2] Consequently, I do not want to argue that cadavers are 
indeed bearers of human rights, or, in the case of Marlise Munoz, that 
her cadaver indeed had a ‘right’ to equality and so forth.
The fact that cadavers are not protected under the Constitution 
and possess no rights[32] apart from those highlighted by Prof.
McQuoid-Mason regarding the desecration of a corpse and so forth, 
does not necessarily imply that the living can make no provisions 
that will be honoured upon death, or that society may do whatever 
it pleases with the body of the deceased, as is done by the hospital 
in the case under discussion. There are countless situations where 
the living make decisions on how their future dead bodies will be 
treated and where those decisions are indeed being honoured and 
respected. Society respects a dead person’s wish regarding how and 
when they wish to be buried, or whether, instead, they prefer to be 
cremated. The law respects the living’s wishes regarding whether 
they want to donate their organs upon their death or whether or 
not they want to donate their cadavers for medical research. In 
addition, an entire field of law has developed around giving effect 
to the will of the deceased regarding the disposal of their property 
after their death.
Over many centuries philosophers have grappled with questions 
as to whose interests are being respected in the examples mentioned 
above, and whose wishes are being carried out. Some argue that it 
is the living person’s wishes or interests, in events that occur after 
their deaths that are being respected. Others argue that the dead, 
themselves, have a limited range of ongoing interests.[35] Ronald 
Dworkin[36] maintains the latter, which he calls ‘critical interests’ – 
the interests of the living in what will become of their cadavers. 
Wilkinson[37] stresses the importance of these critical interests to the 
human personality: what happens ‘after death can (depending on 
the particular person’s own idea of self-development) complete the 
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development of the self’. Based on these views it is indeed possible 
to say, at the very least, that some interests of the cadaver are being 
protected by the law; even if these are not ‘rights’ in the classic sense 
of the term.[38]
Marlise Munoz indicated to her relatives that she did not want to 
be kept alive by artificial means. The hospital was made fully aware 
of her wishes by her proxy, her husband. Whether we can call these 
wishes regarding what happens after her death merely ‘interests’ or 
whether they are ‘rights’, it is clear that they were not given effect to, 
until a court order was obtained compelling the hospital to do this. In 
addition, it is evident that the hospital would have acted differently 
had Marlise Munoz not been 14 weeks pregnant. She lost her ‘interest’ 
in what happens after her death to her cadaver because she was 
pregnant. Her pregnant dead body, therefore, had been disowned by 
the hospital, and her interests in it had been disclaimed.
Conclusion
A woman’s autonomous choice regarding her end-of-life care should 
be inviolable, unaffected by whether or not she may be pregnant. 
This is supported by the Ethics Committee of the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists: ‘pregnant women’s autonomous 
(end-of-life) decisions should be respected, and concerns about the 
impact of those decisions on fetal well-being should be … understood 
within the context of the women’s values’.[39]
The SA legal system has not yet had to consider the complex 
ethical and legal questions that beset new technologies that enable 
the artificial ventilation and support of brain-dead pregnant cadavers 
such as Marlise Munoz. It is in the best interests of our society that 
these questions be addressed carefully and thoughtfully. And when 
they are, perhaps the wisest answer might simply be to accept the 
course of nature: a woman’s capacity to nurture a life, any life, ceases 
with her death.
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